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A POST-SCRIPT TO CAROLENE PRODUCTS 
Frank R. Strong* 
A well-known chain distributor of dairy products advertises 
that it does "Our Dairy Best" to serve its customers. For a century 
dairy interests in the United States have done their very best to stifle 
competition from product substitutes. The classic instance is the 
determined effort to suppress lower-cost oleomargarine when it 
gained popular favor after a patent on the process for its manufac-
ture was obtained in 1873. Resort to protection from this interloper 
quickly followed in the legislative halls of state assemblies and the 
Congress. In 1885 Pennsylvania enacted a prohibition on the man-
ufacture or sale of oleomargarine; the law was upheld by the 
Supreme Court in Powell v. Pennsylvania.' In 1886 Congress im-
posed on colored oleo a heavy excise tax, which the Supreme Court 
sustained in McCray v. United States.2 With victory in the legisla-
tures and in the Court, the dairy interests enjoyed until mid-century 
a suppression of colored oleomargarine, equivalent to total prohibi-
tion because of consumer distaste for white spread.3 
At this juncture in butter's battle against oleo, dairy interests 
became aware of a threat from another quarter. Filled milk is pro-
duced by extracting the butter fat from whole milk and replacing it 
with a vegetable oil. Like oleo, the substitute is marketable at a 
lower price. Back to legislatures went the dairy interests. Again 
their reception was cordial; state lawmakers enacted the requested 
prohibition on filled milk, and Congress crowned success with pas-
sage of the Filled Milk Act in 19234 prohibiting the movement of 
Boshamer University Distinguished Professor Emeritus, University of North Caro-
lina-Chapel Hill. 
I. 127 u.s. 678 (1888). 
2. 195 u.s. 27 (1904). 
3. A notable exception to state court decisions upholding anti-oleo laws was the action 
of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin holding unconstitutional a Wisconsin law prohibiting the 
production and sale of oleo, which by then was no longer made from animal fats. John F. 
Jelke Co. v. Emery, 193 Wis. 311, 214 N.W. 369 (1927). Writing for the court, Justice 
Rosenberry (later Chief Justice) was not taken in by pious pretensions of concern for the 
public health. He flatly rejected the argument "that in order to promote one important in-
dustry the Legislature may, in the exercise of its power to promote the general welfare, crip-
ple or destroy another competing industry." /d. at 322, 214 N.W. at 373. Powell was 
"explained" away. 
4. 21 u.s.c. §§ 61-64 (1982). 
185 
186 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 5:185 
this product in interstate commerce. The constitutionality of the 
federal law was duly challenged by Carotene Products Company, a 
major producer of filled milk. 
My book, Substantive Due Process of Law: A Dichotomy of 
Sense and Nonsense (1986), recounts in chapter 8 the Carolene 
Products litigation in which the Supreme Court twice sustained the 
Act, first on demurrer to the indictment,s and subsequently on ap-
peal from conviction. 6 I vigorously criticized Carolene II on dual 
grounds. First, the assertion of inferior quality had evaporated be-
cause the company meanwhile had fortified its product through in-
troduction of vitamins A and D. Second, when product quality was 
equalized, the claim of consumer confusion afforded no rational ba-
sis for governmental destruction of product competition. Yet after 
forty years, the federal prohibition was still on the statute books at 
the time of my research, as verified by both personal check and 
computer inquiry. 
Hostility to product competition from filled milk was typical of 
anticompetitive regulatory legislation. Reacting to political pres-
sures like those brought to bear by the dairy interests, municipal 
and state legislatures had been induced to restrict or forbid competi-
tion in the same product by enactment of occupational licensing 
regulations. By the time of Caro/ene Products I, commentators 
were calling attention to the great number of such ordinances and 
statutes and to their debilitating effect on commodity competition. 7 
Thirty-five years later inroads on commodity competition were, if 
anything, worse. Walter Gellhorn, an acknowledged authority in 
administrative law, identified instances of abuse in licensing and de-
clared, "That restricting access is the real purpose, and not merely a 
side effect, of many if not most successful campaigns to institute 
licensing can scarcely be doubted."s 
Recent investigations confirm the continuation of extensive leg-
islative hindrances to open competition. Monopolistic-like market-
ing barriers in the form of licensing ordinances or statutes impose 
untold toll on commodity competition to the public detriment. In 
1982 the Center for Occupational and Professional Assessment of 
the Educational Testing Service of Princeton published a compre-
5. U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
6. Carolene Products Co. v. U.S., 323 U.S. 18 (1944). 
7. Hanft & Hamrick, Haphazard Regimentation Under Licensing Statutes, 17 N.C.L. 
REv. I (1938) (with special reference to North Carolina); Silverman, Bennett & Lechliter, 
Control by Licensing Over Entry Into the Market, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 234 (1941) 
(the situation nationwide). 
8. Gellhom, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 6, II (1976). 
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hensive study of occupational regulation in the United States.9 Ap-
pendix 3 lists sixty-four (64) "Occupations Regulated in the States" 
from abstractor to weighmaster. This listing is far from complete, 
omitting such occupations as horseshoers, egg candlers, and light-
ning rod installers. The total is said to be 800. In ten chapters Dr. 
Shimberger examines all facets of three types of regulation: practice 
control (licensing), title control (certification), and registration (list-
ing for business entry with the prescribed government agency). Ma-
jor emphasis is upon the first type. 
The following appears in the introduction to the Shimberger 
study: 
The uncritical acceptance of licensing began to lose ground during the late 
1960's and early 1970's as several federal agencies conducted studies of licensing 
and issued reports that were quite critical of the way in which licensing had been 
used in several occupations [naming the prescription drug industry, the ophthalmic 
dispensing industry, and the funeral industry]. The FfC reports on these industries 
charged that licensing boards sometimes used their powers to restrict competition 
so that consumers had to pay more for goods and services. 
Similar charges were made by the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department 
of Justice. Legal actions were instituted against a number of professional associa-
tions and state licensing boards, alleging anticompetitive practices. For example, 
engineers, architects, and accountants were accused of prohibiting competitive bid-
ding by characterizing such bidding as "unprofessional conduct." ... One effect of 
such litigation has been to reinforce in the public mind the impression that licensing 
boards, at least in some fields, were using their power to restrict competition and 
that such restrictions were not in the public interest. 
In 1986, the American Association of Retired Persons pub-
lished a study of its Section on Consumer Affairs, based upon re-
search undertaken for the Section by the Regulatory Alternatives 
Development Corporation. Entitled "A Report on the Effect of 
Certain State Occupational Licensing Regulations on Consumers," 
investigation was made of "four areas of particular concern to older 
consumers: Optometry, Dentistry, Hearing Aid Sales, and Funeral 
Sales." From data brought together on these areas, relying inter 
alia on hearings and reports of the Federal Trade Commission, the 
conclusion reached in each instance was that these restrictions are 
anticompetitive and undesirable. 
Detail on restrictive devices and variations from state to state is 
exhaustive. Tables I and II of the appendix graphically set forth 
commercial practice restraints in selling eyewear and dental serv-
ices, respectively. Forty-five states impose employment restrictions 
in optometry; 41 restrict lay corporations in dentistry. Exactly the 
same number of states (44) ban use of trade names in each profes-
9. B. SHIMBERGER, OcCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A PUBLIC PERSPECTIVE (1982). 
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sion. By contrast, in optometry restrictions are frequent with re-
spect to location (33) and branches (22), whereas with dentistry 
only 10 states proscribe branches while Virginia alone restricts loca-
tion. The report concludes: "Significant savings on the cost of pro-
fessional goods and services are denied to consumers by the 
existence of unjustified, anti-competitive laws and regulations." 
Wholesale destruction of commodity competition was open 
season for those who politically were able to secure governmental 
favoritism against business rivals, for such legislative displacement 
of market forces survived challenge after challenge in the Supreme 
Court. An early attack was repulsed in Ohio ex rei. Clarke v. Deck-
ebach. 10 In the late 1940s, after Carolene Products II, two chal-
lenges failed in rapid succession. 11 
It was the same story in the next decade, Williamson v. Lee 
Optical, Inc. 12 and twenty years later, in New Orleans v. Dukes.l3 
With this repeated refusal of the Court to invalidate monopolistic 
incursions against competition in the same product, what hope was 
there for judicial protection of less-recognized competition among 
rival products, especially after 1981 when the Court had tolerated a 
replica of Carolene Products?l4 
Imagine, then, my astonishment when my spouse spotted 12-
ounce cans labelled FILLED MILK in large lettering on a shelf of a 
local supermarket! Small print on the otherwise plain labels identi-
fied the distributor as a food broker located in Richmond, Virginia; 
the product appeared to be flowing in interstate commerce despite 
the federal law. Upon my inquiry, the broker disclosed the surpris-
ing fact that the producer was Carnation Co., nationally known for 
its production and distribution of evaporated whole milk. The bro-
ker courteously forwarded my inquisitive letter to Carnation; in due 
course the resulting reply from the Carnation Co. resolved the 
mystery. 15 
10. 274 U.S. 392 (1927) (Cincinnati ordinance prohibited the licensing of aliens for 
operation of pool and billiard halls). 
II. Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners, 330 U.S. 552 (1947) (Louisiana 
law required piloting at New Orleans by pilots certified by the Board; the Board certified only 
friends and relatives of incumbent pilots); Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 
220 (1949) (South Carolina law outlawing business specializing in "funeral insurance"). 
12. 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (Oklahoma law restricting opticians in favor of optometrists 
and opthomologists). 
13. 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (city ordinance forbidding pushcart food vendors in the French 
Quarter except for two, one selling hot dogs and the other ice cream, who had been first in the 
business). 
14. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (plastic milk contain-
ers barred but paperboard milk cartons permitted). 
15. Letter from Attorney Christine M. Pfeiffer (March 11, 1987) (Legal Department, 
Carnation Corporation). 
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In late 1972, the reply explained, the constitutionality of the 
Filled Milk Act had been successfully challenged in a declaratory 
judgment action brought in federal court by Milnot Co., which in 
1950 had succeeded to Carotene Products Co.. Defending was Elli-
ott Richardson, then Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. 16 
District Judge Morgan held the prohibition of the product's move-
ment in interstate commerce to be violative of the due process 
clause of the fifth amendment. The basis of invalidity was the fact 
that certain imitation milk and dairy products, such as dairy cream-
ers, which had been held to be outside the purview of the Act, were 
indistinguishable from Milnot in composition, appearance, and use. 
Judge Morgan did not question the applicability of the rational ba-
sis test in the Caro/ene Products decisions. In his judgment, how-
ever, the record was "crystal clear" that even that dilute nexus was 
wanting in the case before him. "The possibility of confusion, or 
passing off, in the marketplace, which justified the statute in 1944, 
can no longer be used rationally as a constitutional prop to prevent 
interstate shipment of Milnot. There is at least as much danger in 
this regard with imitation milk as with filled milk, and actually no 
longer any such real danger with either."11 Judge Morgan justified 
his reconsideration of the constitutional issue by relying on a princi-
ple earlier established by the Supreme Court in Chastleton Corp. v. 
Sinclair 1s: a law first held valid may later, by force of circum-
stances, become unconstitutional. 
The government filed notice of appeal in the Supreme Court. 
Amazingly, however, the appeal was withdrawn and Judge Mor-
gan's holding was allowed to stand. The explanation is found in the 
Federal Register.'9 On consideration of the matter the Food and 
Drug Administration concurred in recommendation no. 8 of panel 
III-2, Final Report of the 1969 White House Conference on Food, 
Nutrition and Health: "Restrictive laws and regulations such as the 
Filled Milk Act . . . should be replaced immediately in order to 
permit all foods to compete in the marketplace on the basis of their 
overall properties." "Accordingly, it has been concluded that the 
decision in the Mil not case will not be appealed." Then followed 
the coup de grace: 
This notice will serve to inform the public that, pursuant to the court decision 
in this case, the Filled Milk Act will no longer be enforced. Henceforth, filled milk 
products may be lawfully shipped in interstate commerce and will be regulated 
16. Milnot Co. v. Richardson, 350 F. Supp. 221 (S.D. Ill. 1972). 
17. /d. at 225. 
18. 264 u.s. 543 (1924). 
19. 38 Fed. Reg. 20,748 (1973). 
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under the provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, just as any 
other foods. 
With this fundamental change from prohibition to permission, the 
Commissioner of Food and Drugs proceeded with promulgation of 
interim labeling requirements for filled milk products.2o 
By the time of Judge Morgan's 1972 decision, "the majority of 
states now permit wholesome and properly labeled filled milk prod-
ucts. "21 This fact was influential in his conclusion that the dangers 
of confusion which led to the Supreme Court's constitutional affir-
mation of the Federal Filled Milk Act "have long since ceased to 
exist. "22 Repeal in 1960 of the Kentucky statutory ban on filled 
milk23 is illustrative of the changing legislative position. In those 
states where prohibitory laws remained, invalidation by state courts 
had begun by the end of the 1960s. In 1968, Georgia overruled an 
earlier decision sustaining the prohibition, although in that year the 
Washington Supreme Court held that state's prohibition valid. 
Florida overruled in 1970, foilowed by Colorado and Idaho the next 
year. 
A recent major decision is that of Strehlow v. Kansas State 
Board of Agriculture.24 Overruling as a denial of due process an 
earlier validation of the state law forbidding sale of "filled dairy 
products," the Kansas Supreme Court quoted extensively from 
Judge Morgan's opinion and from the dissent in its own earlier deci-
sion. That dissent sensed the anticompetitive nature of the state 
statute, typing it as a trade-barrier law "designed primarily to ad-
vance the interests of the dairy industry." Other state courts have 
overruled similar statutes, based as was Judge Morgan's action on 
the absence of any nexus between filled milk laws and the legitimate 
reach of the police power. 
In final result the full account of dairy opposition to filled milk 
closely resembles that for oleomargarine, which finally collapsed 
with and following World War II. Constitutionalists of liberal per-
suasion will express approval of these case histories on the basis that 
the outcomes demonstrate democratic governance at its best-judi-
cial tolerance of legislative product favoritism until sufficient experi-
ence that the public interest has been thwarted rather than 
advanced. I disagree. Anglo-American history is replete with evi-
dence of the evils of monopoly, the reaction to which early became 
20. 38 Fed. Reg. 20,749 (1973). 
21. Milnot, 350 F. Supp. at 224-25 n.l. 
22. /d. at 224. 
23. 1960 Ky. Acts ch. 247, § 24. 
24. 232 Kan. 589, 659 P.2d 785 (1983). 
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embedded in substantive due process of law. The American consti-
tutional plan does not allow free rein to political processes else-
where in clashes between government and the individual over basic 
rights; there exists no justification for a differing standard in con-
cerns of fundamental economic interests. The myth of preferred 
freedoms has no constitutional foundation. 
